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Cowan: Cowan: Modification of an Undersecured

Modification of an Undersecured Home
Mortgage in a Chapter 13 Proceeding
Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland)1
In Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland),2 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that 11 U.S.C. section 1322(b)(2),3 which
provides for modification of the rights of holders of secured claims other than
a claim secured only by a debtor's principal residence, did not protect the
unsecured portion of an undersecured claim in the residence from modification
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sections 506(a) and (d).4 In so holding, it was the first
circuit court to address the interplay between section 1322(b)(2) and section
506 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Since Hougland, both the Third Circuit and the Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeal have addressed the issue and reached the same result.5 While no

1. 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Hougland 11].
2. Id.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) provides:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may ...
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims ....

Id.
4. Hougland II, 886 F.2d at 1184. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) provides in.
pertinent part: "(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is
not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void. .. " Id.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest
is less than the amount of such allowed claim ....
...

Id.
5. See Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir.
1991) (an undersecured mortgage is protected by section 1322 (b)(2) only to the extent
of the secured claim, and bifurcation is a recognition of the legal status of creditor's
interest and not a modification of the mortgage); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990) (section 1322(b)(2) does not preclude the
modification of any unsecured portion of an undersecured claim in a debtor's principal
residence.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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other circuit courts have ruled on this issue, district courts and bankruptcy
courts from other circuits reflect a split of authority.6 Courts in the Second,
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh

Circuits have followed Hougland,7 while

bankruptcy courts in the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held
that such bifurcation is inappropriate.8
This Note will explain and analyze the theory used in Hougland and the
theories used by other courts addressing the issue, and will then conclude that
the Hougland court's result is fair, logical, and should be adopted by all
courts.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In January 1983, Estel and Ruth Hougland ("Debtors") obtained a loan
from The Lomas & Nettleton Company ("L & N"). 9 The parties executed a
promissory note and a deed of trust secured solely by Debtors' principal
residence.' ° Debtors fell behind on their payments and L & N commenced
foreclosure proceedings." Debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby staying the foreclosure action.' At the time
the bankruptcy petition was filed, the value of Debtors' property was
approximately $47,000, and the outstanding loan balance was approximately

$51,000.13

6. Hart, 923 F.2d at 1414.
7. See In re Frost, 123 Bankr. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832

(D.N.J. 1989); In re Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re McNair,
115 Bankr. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Demoff, 109 Bankr. 902, 915
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
8. Hart, 923 F.2d at 1414 (citing In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 733, 736-37 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re
Schum, 112 Bankr. 159, 162 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr.
200, 202-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705 (D.N.D. 1988)).
See also In re Mitchell, Nos. 90-11369, 90-11289 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 13, 1991)
(WESTLAW, FBKR-CS database).
9. Hougland II, 886 F.2d at 1182 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. Id.
11. In re Hougland, 93 Bankr. 718, 719 (D. Or. 1988) [hereinafter Hougland1].
12. Id.
13. HouglandlI,886 F.2d at 1182-83. The Debtors' loan was obtained under an
Oregon program for veterans of the United States Armed Forces permitting negative
amortization for a period of time before the principal decreases. Id. at 1182. At the
time of filing, the value of the property was $47,240 while the outstanding balance of
the debt was $51,090, including arrearages, interest, foreclosure fees, and late fees.
Hougland I, 93 Bankr. at 719.
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Debtors' plan sought to avoid the unsecured portion of L & N's lien14
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 506(d).u L & N objected to the plan as
violative of 11 U.S.C. section 1322(b)(5), which allows the modification of
the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in a debtors' principal residence. 6 L & N contended that
the plan impermissibly modified L & N's rights as a creditor holding a debt
secured only by a security interest in Debtors' principal residence.' 7 The
bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the plan and denied Debtors' motion
for reconsideration. 8 Debtors then appealed the bankruptcy court's decision

to the United States District Court of Oregon.' 9
On appeal, Debtors argued that section 1322(b)(2) only afforded
protection to the fully secured portion of L & N's claim.2 0 They contended
that the plan did not impermissibly modify the secured portion of L & N's
claim; rather, it avoided only the portion of L & N's claim defined as
unsecured by 11 U.S.C. section 506(a).2' Debtors further argued that section
506(a) and section 1322(b)(2) were not in conflict and could be read
together. 2'
L & N again argued that avoidance of a portion of its claim, through the
operation of section 506(d), was an impermissible modification of its rights
as a creditor under section 1322(b)(2). 23 L & N contended that the more
specific provisions of section 1322, which apply only to cases under Chapter
13, should prevail over the general provisions of section 506, which apply to
cases under Chapters 7, 11, 12 and 13.2 '
The district court noted there were three groups of cases analyzing the
interplay between these two sections 5 The first group of cases held that
section 1322(b)(2) did not protect the unsecured portion of undersecured
junior mortgages.' 6 The court stated, however, that those cases provided

14. The unsecured portion was the difference between the amount of the claim,
$51,090, and the value of the property, $47,240. HouglandI, 93 Bankr. at 719.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Hougland1, 93 Bankr. at 719. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
HouglandI, 93 Bankr. at 719.
Id. at 720.
Id.

20. Id. at 721.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
HouglandI, 93 Bankr. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.

26. Id. (citing In re Simmons, 78 Bankr. 300 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (where
second mortgage was under-collateralized, mortgagee was not protected by noPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 12
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

only indirect support for Debtors' position because they did not involve undersecured first mortgage claims.27 The second group of cases, which Debtors
relied on, held that the unsecured portion of a first mortgage could be avoided
by the operation of section 506(d) without creating an impermissible
modification of the mortgagee's rights under section 1322(b)(2).' The court
also noted that a leading bankruptcy treatise29 supported this approach.30
The third group, upon which L & N relied, held that the unsecured portion of
a junior lienholder's claim could not be avoided by the operation of section
506(d). 3' The court noted -that this reasoning did not directly support L &
N's position, but the court did recognize that In re Russell 32 had applied that
reasoning to an undersecured first mortgage. 33
The court then concluded that the second group of cases and the treatise
Collier on Bankruptcy provided the "better-reasoned" view34 and held that
the no-modification clause of section 1322(b)(2) protected L & N's security
interest in the Debtors' principal residence only to the extent that the claim

modification provision of section 1322(b)(2), and undersecured portion of claim could
be avoided under section 506(d)).
27. Hougland1,93 Bankr. at 721.
28. Id. at 722. (citing Caster v. United States (In re Caster), 77 Bankr. 8 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987) (bifurcation of the allowed claim is proper pursuant to section 506
because section 1322(b)(2) should only protect those security interests which really
exist); Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Serv. (In re Kehm), 90 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (application of section 506 to an undersecured first mortgage did not create
the type of modification prohibited by section 1322 (b)(2)). The view in Casterwas
at 722.
expressed as dicta. Hougland I, 93 Bankr.
29. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a] (18th ed. 1988).
30. Hougland1,93 Bankr. at 722; 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]
(15th ed. 1988) provides:
[S]ince this section [1322(b)(2)] only applies to the modification of the
rights of holders of claims by the Chapter 13 plan, it does not affect the
determination of the allowed secured claim through operation of section
506. Hence an undersecured claim secured only by a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence may still be divided into an allowed secured
claim and an allowed unsecured claim, with the lien declared void to the
extent it secures a claim in excess of the allowed secured claim.
Id.
31. Hougland 1,93 Bankr. at 721-22. (citing In re Hynson, 66 Bankr. 246
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (the specific provision of section 1322 prevails over the general
provision of section 506)).
32. 93 Bankr. 703 (D.N.D. 1988).
33. Hougland 1,93 Bankr. at 722.
34. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/12
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was actually secured, and did not prohibit Debtors' avoidance of the unsecured
portion of L & N's claim under section 506(d).
L & N appealed the district court's decision.36 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a mortgagee has an undersecured
claim in a debtor's principal residence, the court could bifurcate the lender's
claim into secured and unsecured portions, with only the secured portion
receiving the special protection provided by the no-modification provision of
section 1322(b)(2).37
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Code Provisions
Congress has provided for the classification and modification of a
creditor's claims against a debtor in 11 U.S.C. section 506. In United States
38 the Supreme Court held that section 506(a)
v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
classifies a claim as secured only to the extent of the value of the property on
which the lien is fixed, and then the remainder of the claim is considered
unsecured. 9 Once the claim is classified, section 506(d) provides for the
reduction or elimination of the unsecured portion of the creditor's claim. 4°
Under 11 U.S.C. section 103(a), section 506 applies to Chapter 13 proceedings.41
The modification of a creditor's claim in a Chapter 13 proceeding is
addressed in 11 U.S.C. section 1322(b)(2).4' This section provides that the
debtor's bankruptcy plan may modify the rights of holders of both secured and

35. Id. at 722-23. The Court also held that language in the deed of trust granting
L & N additional security in rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the Debtors'
principal residence did not prevent L & N's claim from being secured "only" by a
security interest in real property that was Debtors' principal residence so to be within
the no-modification clause of section 1322(b)(2), where the deed of trust did not
contain language granting L & N a mortgage security interest in specific personalty.
Id. at 720-21.
36. Hougland I, 886 F.2d at 1182.
37. Id. at 1184.
38. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
39. Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. HouglandII,886 F.2d at 1184. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988) provides: "Except

as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a
case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title." Id.

42. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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unsecured claims, with one exception.43 The bankruptcy plan may not
modify a claim secured only by a security interest in the debtor's principal
residence. 44 This provision's purpose was to respond to perceptions or
suggestions advanced in the legislative hearings that home mortgage lenders
were performing a valuable social service through their loans and needed
45
special protection against modification of their claims.
B. JudicialInterpretation
Courts have analyzed many factors to determine whether section

1322(b)(2) protects from modification that portion of an undersecured claim
in a debtor's principal residence that is considered unsecured under section
506(a). The most common factor considered by the courts is statutory
construction. The language of section 1322(b)(2) provides that a bankruptcy
plan "may modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims . . . ."' Since 11
U.S.C. section 101(4) defines "claim" as including both secured and unsecured
claims, courts must determine whether the word "claim" in the "other than"
47
clause refers to secured claims, unsecured claims, or both.
Courts whose opinions are typified by Houglandmade their determination
by construing the plain language of the statute itself.'
In so doing, most

43. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
45. Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir.
1984).
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988) provides: "'claim' means ... right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured. .. ." Id. (emphasis added).
48. See In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) ("In interpreting any
statute, we 'begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."')
(quoting Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 1988)); Wilson
v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990) ("in determining
the meaning of any statute, 'the words of the statute are the primary, and ordinarily the
most reliable, source of interpreting' its meaning .... ") (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451
U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981)); In re Frost, 123 Bankr. 254, 257 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re
Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 835 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Watt, 451 U.S. at 266 n.9)); In re
Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856, 860 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Demoff, 109 Bankr. 902,
919 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Serv., 90 Bankr. 117,
120 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/12
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of these courts determined that "claim," in the section 1322(b)(2) "other than"
clause,49 applies only to the "secured claims" language that precedes it."
The court in In re Harris,5 however, finding the language ambiguous, stated
that legislative history supported its determination that only secured claims
were prohibited from modification. 2
Courts consistent with Hougland have often addressed the legislative
history of section 1322(b)(2), 3 but with the exception of Harris,5 4 legisla55
tive history has not been a determinative factor in the courts' decisions.
The courts, however, have often supported their result with such additional
factors as the legislative purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a "fresh

49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
50. See Hart,923 F.2d at 1415 ("We find nothing in the plain language of section
1322(b)(2) which instructs us to go beyond the Code's statutory definition of the term
'secured claims' to protect the unsecured portion of an undersecured home mortgage."); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127 ("[Tlhe 'other than' phrase should be read to limit
modification only of that portion of the claim that is secured."); Frost, 123 Bankr. at
257 ("[Tjhe word 'claim' in the 'other than' phrase must be a secured claim because
the words 'secured claim' precede and modify the entire phrase.. . ."); Bellamy, 122
Bankr. at 860-61 ("Because the 'other than' clause immediately follows 'holders of
secured claims,' the secured claim language is the referent of the 'other than' clause.
...")(quoting Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801,
804 (9th Cir. 1989)); Demoff, 109 Bankr. at 919 ("[Tjhe later phrase refers to the prior
phrase, and only the secured claim portion as defined in § 506(a) is protected from
modification."); Kehm, 90 Bankr. at 119 ("The only logical, semantic interpretation of
this section is that the § 1322(b)(2) prohibition against modification is limited to fully
secured claims.").
51. 94 Bankr. 833, 835 (D.N.J. 1989).
52. Id. at 835.
53. See, e.g., Hart, 923 F.2d at 1412; Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127-28; Bellamy, 122
Bankr. at 861; Demoff, 109 Bankr. at 919-20.
54. Harris,94 Bankr. at 836.
is not clear
55. See, e.g., Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415 ("[L]egislative history ...
enough.., to show a 'demonstrably' different congressional intent than that indicated
by the plain meaning of the statute itself."); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127 ("Unfortunately,
our review of the history of the provision does not provide much insight into the
critical question here."); Bellamy, 122 Bankr. at 861 ("The legislative history ... is
not completely unambiguous.... ."); Demoff, 109 Bankr. at 919-20.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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start" to the debtor, 56 or their doubt that the result will substantially affect
creditors.57
Courts rejecting the Hougland court's reasoning find that the statutory
provisions in sections 1322(b)(2) and 506(a) are in conflict, 58 or that
modification of the unsecured claim would vitiate the purpose of section
1322(b)(2) to protect home-mortgage lenders.59
The most prominent
decisions in this area are In re Hynson,60 which addressed both the statutory
conflict and the purpose of section 1322(b)(2), and In re Catlin,6 ' which only
addressed the conflict issue. The Hynson and Catlin courts both held that
since section 506(a) and section 1322(b)(2) conflicted, the specific provisions
of section 1322(b)(2) should supersede the general provisions of section
506(a). Therefore, the no-modification prohibition in the "other than" clause
should apply to both the secured and unsecured portions of the creditor's
claim. 62 The Hynson court went on to hold that the application of the "cramdown" provisions of section 506 would vitiate the protections of section
1322(b)(2). 63 Many courts have used the reasoning in Catlin and Hynson to
prohibit the modification of the unsecured portion of a creditor's claim
secured by a debtor's principal residence. 64

56. See, e.g., In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1989); In re McNair, 115
Bankr. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Frost, 123 Bankr. 254, 257-58 (S.D.
Ohio 1990).
57. See, e.g., Harris,94 Bankr. at 835; Demoff, 109 Bankr. at 920-21.
58. See; e.g., In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Mitchell,
Nos. 90-11369, 90-11289 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 13, 1991) (VESTLAW, FBKR-CS
database); In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 733, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting In re
Catlin, 81 Bankr. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987)); In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. 197,
199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112 Bankr. 159, 160-61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re
Hemsing, 75 Bankr. 689, 691-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Russell, 93 Bankr. at 706; Mitchell, Nos. 90-11369, 90-11289;
Chavez, 117 Bankr. at 734; Sauber, 115 Bankr. at 199; Schum, 112 Bankr. at 162;
Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202; Hemsing, 75 Bankr. at 692.
60. 66 Bankr. 246 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) rejected by In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832
(D.N.J. 1989). Although Hynson was later overruled, its analysis influenced other
courts.
61. 81 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
62. Catlin, 81 Bankr. at 524; Hynson, 66 Bankr. at 250 (quoting In re Mahaner,
34 Bankr. 308, 309 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983)).
63. Hynson, 66 Bankr. at 252.
64. See In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Mitchell, Nos.
90-11369, 90-11289 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 13,1991)(WESTLAW, FBKR-CS database);
In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 7:33, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 Bankr.
197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); in re Schurn, 112 Bankr. 159, 160-61 (Bankr. N.D.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/12
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One court has also looked at the prior Bankruptcy Act to determine that
modification of an undersecured claim in the debtor's principal residence is
prohibited.6 The court found that since the prior Bankruptcy Act did not
allow Chapter 13 debtors to modify any secured claims, this suggested that
Congress did not want to change from that position with respect to home
mortgages.'
Within this legal background, the Hougland court weighed the various
factors and determined that the unsecured portion of the creditor's claim was
not protected from modification by section 1322(b)(2).
III. INSTANT DECISION
The Hougland court67 addressed L & N's contention that section
1322(b)(2) protected from modification the unsecured portion of L & N's
undersecured claim. 6s The court first noted that the issue was one of
statutory construction and then looked at the language of section 1322(b)(2)

and the interpretation given section 506(a) by Ron PairEnterprises.69 In so
doing, the court recognized that courts differed in their interpretation of
section 1322 and whether the section affected the section 506(a) provision
dividing the undersecured claim into a secured portion and an unsecured
portion.70 Some courts had held that nothing in section 1322 affected the
classification of the claim as secured and unsecured under section 506(a),7
while others had held that section 1322(b)(2) prevented the separate treatment
of what would otherwise be an unsecured claim.72

Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re
Hemsing, 75 Bankr. 689, 691-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
65. Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202-03.
66. Id.
67. Judge Fernandez wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Pregerson and
Judge Trott joined.
68. HouglandII, 886 F.2d at 1183.69. Id. at 1183. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for the Ron Pair
Enter. court's definition of section 506(a).
70. HouglandII, 886 F.2d at 1183.
71. Id. at 1183 (citing Harris,94 Bankr. at 832; In re Frost, 96 Bankr. 804
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989), aff'd, 123 Bankr. 254; Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Serv.,
90 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Caster, 77 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987); In re Bruce, 40 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984)).
72. Hougland II, 886 F.2d at 1183 (citing In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705
(D.N.D. 1988); In re Brown, 91 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Catlin, 81 Bankr.
at 522; In re Hemsing, 75 Bankr. 689 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); Hynson, 66 Bankr. at
246).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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In interpreting the two statutes,73 the court stated that the language of
the statute itself should be the guiding factor.74 Since section 103(a) applied
section 506(a) to Chapter 13 proceedings, there was no reason to believe that
the phrases "secured claim" and "unsecured claim" in section 1322(b)(2) could
have any other meaning than those given them by section 506(a).75
Therefore, L & N's claim had a "secured" component and an "unsecured"
component. 76 The court then addressed the "other than" clause of section
1322(b)(2) 77 and found that the clause addressed what preceded it, indicating
that only the secured portion received special protection. 78 The court
rejected the Russell court's finding that section 1322 is violated if the
unsecured portion of the claim is affected by the plan 79 because that suggests
that the "other than" clause also referred to the unsecured portion of the
claim.8
The court then determined that section 506(a) and section 1322(b)(2)
were "in harmony when read in the context of the whole statute," rejecting In
re Hemsing,81 which had held that the statutes conflicted.' The court also
noted that Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.83 required the court to look

for other guidance if the court's construction would lead to an absurd
result.8' The court concluded, however, that since the truly secured portion
of the lender's claim would still receive protection, no absurdity existed 3
'This construction was also supported by a leading treatise on bankruptcy
law.6 In response to other courts' concerns that such a construction would
severely undermine the statute,87 the court suggested that most residential

73. See supra section II.B. of this Note.
74. Hougland1H, 886 F.2d at 1183 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489
U.S. 235 (1989)).
75. Id. at 1183-84.
76. Id. at 1184.
77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
78. Hougland1, 886 F.2d at 1184.
79. In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988).
80. HouglandHI, 886 F.2d at 1184.

81. 75 Bankr. 689, 691 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (section 1322 and section 506 are
in conflict).
82. HouglandII, 886 F.2d at 1184 (citing Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,
489 U.S. 803 (1989)).
83. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
84. Id.
85. Hougland I, 886 F.2d at 1184.
86. Id. (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[a] (18th ed. 1988).
87. E.g., In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 706 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Hynson, 66
Bankr. 246, 252 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
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mortgage lenders would ensure that they had a sufficient cushion to avoid
being in an undersecured position?2
Finally, the court noted that courts who-had addressed the legislative
history of the statute found that the purpose of the statute was to benefit
residential real estate lenders, which was already made obvious by the "other
than" clause.8 9 Additionally, there was no need to concentrate on the
legislative history if the statute was internally consistent and could be
construed according to its plain language.90 The court then held that
Congress plainly provided for the separation of undersecured claims into a
secured portion and an unsecured portion and that the unsecured portion did
not receive protection from modification under section 1322(b)(2). 9'
IV. COMMENT
The Hougland court reached a fair and logical result. As a result, the
Hougland decision on the issue of modification of undersecured claims in a
Chapter 13 proceeding has become the majority position among the courts and
is consistent with the leading treatise on bankruptcy law. 92 Moreover, the
Hynson decision, which influenced other courts to reject Hougland,93 has
itself been overruled.94

Courts consistent with Hougland have reached a logical result in
construing the interplay between section 1322 and section 506. "In analyzing
the construction of the statute, 'the starting point' is the 'language itself'."'95
"In addition, the 'plain meaning' of the language is the 'primary, and
ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of a
statute'."96 Section 506 treats an undersecured creditor as a holder of two
entirely separate claims. 97 Section 1322 then allows for modification of "the

88. Hougland II, 886 F.2d at 1184-85.
89. Id. at 1185.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a] (18th ed. 1988).
93. See, e.g., In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Chavez,
117 Bankr. 733, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Schum, 112 Bankr. 159, 162
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1984); In re Hemsing, 75 Bankr. 689, 691-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
94. See In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 836 (D.NJ. 1989).
95. Harris,94 Bankr. at 835 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
96. Harris,94 Bankr. at 835 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9
(1981)).
97. In re Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856, 860 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (citing Goins v.
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rights of holders of a secured claim, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of
holders of unsecured claimg." 98 From this plain language, only the secured
portion of the claim would be subject to the protection of section
1322(b)(2).9
In Wilshire Westwood Association v. Atlantic Richfield Corp.,' °° the
court stated that a qualifying phrase must be applied to words or phrases immediately preceding it.' 0 ' Using this reasoning, the word "claim" in the "other than"
clause of section 1322(b)(2) would refer only to the "secured claim" phrase
immediately preceding it.l 02
In addition, the court in In re Bellamy'"' has noted that if Congress had
intended an exception to section 506(a), it could have done so expressly, as
it did in 11 U.S.C. section 1111(b)(2).10' "Section 1111(b)(2) provides that
'notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title,' an undersecured creditor may
elect to have an allowed claim treated as a secured claim to the full extent the
claim is allowed, rather than to the extent of the collateral." 1 5 The court
noted that "this conclusion is underscored by the different treatment given
throughout the Code to the secured and unsecured portions of an undersecured
claim."'10
"For example, an undersecured claim survives a Chapter 7
discharge to the extent of the value of the collateral that secures it; the
unsecured portion of the claim is treated separately and discharged .... .""
"Likewise, it is self evident that a creditor with a lien on collateral worth a
small percentage of its claim should be treated in a Chapter 13 plan as holding
one relatively small secured claim and one relatively large unsecured claim,
rather than a single fully secured claim."'1'
As previously noted, courts rejecting Hougland have found that the two
statutes conflict and the specific provisions of section 1322 prevail over the

Diamond Mortgage Corp., 119 Bankr. 156, 162 (N.D. I11. 1990)).
98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
99. In re Frost, 123 Bankr. 254, 257 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
100. 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 804.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
122 Bankr. 856, 860 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
Id.

105. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988).

106.
107.
(7th Cir.
108.
1990)).

Bellamy, 122 Bankr. at 860.
Id. (citing Lindsey v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis, 823 F.2d 189, 190-92
1987)).
Id. (citing Goins v. Diamond Mortgage, 199 Bankr. 156, 162 (N.D. Il.
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general provisions of section 506."° The Hynson court stated that "regardless of the inclusiveness of the general language of [section 506(a)], it does
not apply or prevail over matters specifically dealt with in another part of the
same enactment."" 0 This rule of construction, however, is only applicable
when the statutes conflict."' The Hougland court's construction does not
find the statutes in conflict, but rather "in harmony when read in the context
of the whole statute.""' In addition, section 103(a) is strong evidence that
section 506 was intended to apply to section 1322.113
Courts interpreting the "specific over general" rule avoid its use unless
absolutely necessary. In Aeron Marine Shipping Co. v. United States,"4 the
court stated that this rule of statutory construction is applicable only when
there is an inescapable conflict between the two provisions." 5 In United
States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.," 6 the court stated that statutory provisions
are to be construed, whenever possible, in a way that avoids conflicts and
achieves consistency. 7 The Hougland result would achieve a construction
of section 1322 and section 506 that is consistent with these guidelines.
The legislative history of section 1322 lends additional support to the
Houglandcourt's reasoning. The original House version of section 1322(b)(2)
provided for the modification of the rights of holders of secured claims or
holders of unsecured claims. 1
The original Senate version of section
1322(b)(2) provided for modification of the rights of holders of secured claims
(other than claims wholly secured by mortgages on real property) or of holders
of unsecured claims." 9 "The final version of section 1322(b)(2) represented
a 'compromise agreement' between the House version that allowed modification of all secured claims and the Senate version allowing modification of all
secured claims except 'claims wholly secured by mortgages on real

109. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
110. In re Hynson, 66 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (citing Maitico v.
United States, 302 F.2d 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).

111. In re Demoff, 109 Bankr. 902, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
112. Hougland 1,886 F.2d at 1184.
113. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1990)

(citing In re Lewis, 875 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1989)).
114. 695 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
115. Id. at 576 (citing C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 46.05 (4th ed. 1972)).

116. 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
117. Id. at 1186.
118. In re Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (citing H.R.
8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
119. Id. at 861 (citing S.2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)).
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property'."'" Since the final version represented a compromise between the
pro-debtor House version and the pro-creditor Senate version, which
prohibited the modification 6f claims wholly secured by any real property, the
final version of section 1322(b)(2) would not provide any more protection to
creditors than the original Senate version.121 It is doubtful, however, that
the statute would even provide that much protection. In Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,"2 the court noted that "although it [was] clear that
the anti-modification provision was inserted on behalf of the home mortgage
industry, the fact that the provision itself was a compromise suggests that the
residential mortgage providers did not emerge with all the protection they may
have sought."'"
The Hougland result is as fair as it is logical. In In re Demoff,124 the
court noted that it is doubtful that such a construction would have "considerable impact on first mortgage lenders" if the mortgage was in fact based on
"sound credit judgment."' 25 The court noted that the value of the property
might decrease below the claim in some circumstances, but "if the lender is
at all diligent this should not be a frequent state of affairs so as to impair the
long-term residential mortgage market."" In Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Service Inc.,127 the court stated that "[t]here is good reason to believe
that Congress was contemplating more substantial alterations of rights when
it excepted home mortgagees' rights from section 1322(b)(2)'s general
authorization to 'modify the rights of holders of secured claims'."12 The
court then noted that the Third Circuit had "already ruled that a postacceleration cure, a step with a much more drastic and more immediate impact
on a mortgagee's rights, is not prohibited by section 1322(b)(2).'0 29 It
would appear, therefore, that the Hougland court's construction of these
statutes would not vitiate the protections of section 1322(b)(2), as many courts
rejecting Hougland had feared, because this construction would not leave
section 1322(b)(2) without a raison d'etre130 Furthermore, in addition
to the sound statutory construction and fairness of the Hougland court's

120. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. H1106-07 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,423 (Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).
121. Id.
122. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
123. Id. at 128.
124. 109 Bankr. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
125. Id. at 921.
126. Id.
127. 90 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
128. Id. at 120.
129. Id. at 121.
130. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128.
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decision, the result will encourage debtors to file Chapter 13 proceedings
rather than Chapter 7 proceedings... and is consistent with the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code to provide debtors with a "fresh start, . . .by not
strapping the debtor with preexisting unsecured debt."'3 It is a result,
therefore, that all courts should adopt.
TRACY J. COWAN

131. In re McNair, 115 Bankr. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
132. In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting In re Simmons, 78
Bankr. 300, 304 (D. Kan. 1987)). See also In re Frost, 123 Bankr. 254, 257-58
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); McNair, 115 Bankr. at 523.
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